Commentary for Bava Kamma 2:5

שׁוֹר הַמַּזִּיק בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק כֵּיצַד. נָגַח, נָגַף, נָשַׁךְ, רָבַץ, בָּעַט, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, מְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק. בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק, רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן אוֹמֵר נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים חֲצִי נֶזֶק. אָמַר לָהֶם רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן, וּמַה בִּמְקוֹם שֶׁהֵקֵל עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר, הֶחְמִיר עֲלֵיהֶם בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק לְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם, מְקוֹם שֶׁהֶחְמִיר עַל הַקֶּרֶן בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, לְשַׁלֵּם חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁנַּחְמִיר עָלֶיהָ בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק לְשַׁלֵּם נֶזֶק שָׁלֵם. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מַה בִרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אַף בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק חֲצִי נֶזֶק. אָמַר לָהֶם, אֲנִי לֹא אָדוּן קֶרֶן מִקֶּרֶן, אֲנִי אָדוּן קֶרֶן מֵרֶגֶל. וּמַה בִמְקוֹם שֶׁהֵקֵל עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים, הֶחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן, מְקוֹם שֶׁהֶחְמִיר עַל הַשֵּׁן וְעַל הָרֶגֶל, בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק, אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁנַּחְמִיר בַּקֶּרֶן. אָמְרוּ לוֹ, דַּיּוֹ לַבָּא מִן הַדִּין לִהְיוֹת כַּנִּדּוֹן, מַה בִּרְשׁוּת הָרַבִּים חֲצִי נֶזֶק, אַף בִּרְשׁוּת הַנִּזָּק חֲצִי נֶזֶק:

"An ox that damages in the domain of the nizak" (1:4). How so? If it gored, butted, bit, lay down, or kicked, [all toldoth of keren] — In the public domain, he pays a half-nezek; in the domain of the nizak, R. Tarfon says he pays a full nezek, and the sages say a half-nezek. R. Tarfon said to them: Now if in a place where (Scripture) was lenient with shen and regel — in the public domain — where they are exempt, (Scripture) was stringent with them in the domain of the nizak, making them pay a full nezek — then, in a place where (Scripture) was (relatively) stringent with keren — in the public domain — making it pay a half-nezek, does it not follow that we should be stringent with it in the domain of the nizak and make it pay a full nezek! They said to him: It is sufficient that what is derived from a law be like the law it is derived from. Just as in the public domain (he pays) a half-nezek, so in the domain of the nizak (he pays) a half-nezek. [Keren in the domain of the nizak, which you derive from the law of keren in the public domain, saying: "Keren, with which Scripture was stringent in the public domain, does it not follow that we should be stringent with it in the domain of the nizak" — it is sufficient that it be as (stringent) as the law it is derived from, keren in the public domain, and that it be liable for only a half-nezek in the domain of the nizak as it is in the public domain.] He said to them: I shall not derive keren from keren: [as above, but] I shall derive keren from regel. [In a place where Scripture was stringent with shen and regel, does it not follow that we should be stringent with keren, viz.:] Now if in a place where (Scripture) was lenient with shen and regel — in the public domain — it was stringent with keren — then in a place where it was stringent with shen and regel — in the domain of the nizak — does it not follow that we should be stringent with keren! They said to him: It is sufficient that what is derived from a law be as (stringent) as the law it is derived from. Just as in the public domain (he pays) a half-nezek, so in the domain of the nizak (he pays) a half-nizak. [For in the last analysis, if not for keren in the public domain, the a fortiori argument (kal vachomer) could not be constructed. And R. Tarfon, even though he holds that "It is sufficient, etc." is a Scriptural principle, viz. (Numbers 12:14): "And if her father had spat in her face, would she not be humiliated for seven days!" — a fortiori, vis-à-vis the Shechinah, fourteen days! — but it is sufficient that what is derived from a law be as (stringent) as the law itself, for which reason she is confined for seven days and not more — still, in our instance R. Tarfon does not hold that "It is sufficient, etc." obtains, holding that it applies only where the a fortiori argument is not refuted, as in the above instance, where the seven days of the Shechinah not being written, the a fortiori argument is adduced for fourteen-day liability, and "It is sufficient, etc." removes seven and leaves seven, so that the a fortiori argument is found to establish seven-day liability and is not entirely refuted. But here, where, Scripture prescribes a half-nezek both for the public domain and the domain of the nizak, and the a fortiori argument is adduced for an additional half-nezek, making it a full nezek — if "It is sufficient, etc." were posited and payment were established as a half-nezek as in the beginning, the a fortiori argument would have been entirely refuted, availing naught. And the rabbis hold that even in such an instance, "It is sufficient, etc." is posited. The halachah is in accordance with the sages.]

Rambam on Mishnah Bava Kamma

An ox that damages in the domain of the damager, how is this? It pushes… When it's learned out one law from another with 'lesser to severe' exegesis, It should not be that what we derive (has a penalty) is greater than what we learn from, rather it should be like it. And this is what it says 'it's enough that what comes from the ruling (the exegesis) to be like the ruling'. And there is not in this a disagreement because this is from the Torah, that it says with Miriam 'and if her father spits in her face, would she not be embarrassed for 7 days', all the more so for the divine presence. That if the father gets angry with her she separates from him for seven days, all the more so he who God may his name be blessed gets angry at, that it's appropriate that he be isolated for more days, however, the verse says to isolate for 7 days, behold, there, the law of the divine presence which is learned from the father is like the law of the father. And thus the main point of disagreement of Rav Tarfon and the sages is this, that since Rav Tarfon says at the end, what that we say 'it's enough that what comes from the ruling (the exegesis) to be like the ruling', that when we want to obligate this thing which we learned out from another law that we did not learn out previously, and thus there will not be in it a ruling greater than the ruling from which we learned it out from. Like that we learned that when the divine presence is angry she secludes for 7 days and this thing was not known before this, however, that when there will be by us a known law of one of these things like half damages, and after that we learn this with a lesser to more severe exegesis, if it does not add to the law and obligate to pay full damages, it will be that this exegesis is in vain and does not add a thing to our knowledge, that this half damage was known without a lesser to more severe exegesis. And in a case like this, we do not say 'it's enough that what comes from the ruling (the exegesis) to be like the ruling' because there does not come a ruling, rather half damages are known. And the sages say even in a case like this, we say 'it's enough that what comes from the ruling (the exegesis) to be like the ruling' since it does not come from a ruling, rather we know it was (half) damage [other editions remove from 'Since']. And thus I explained to you this idea that it should not rise in your mind that Rabbi Tarfon does not hold by this rule ('it's enough...') in other places since he believes like this in this place alone, that he does not hold by this as we explained. And the halakha is like the sages.

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Bartenura on Mishnah Bava Kamma

נגח נגף [וכו'] – all of them are derivatives of the horn.

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English Explanation of Mishnah Bava Kamma

“An ox which causes damage in the private domain of him that is injured” how is this so? If it gored, pushed, bit, lay down, or kicked in the public domain its owner pays only half damages.
But if in the private domain of him that is injured, Rabbi Tarfon says, “He pays full damages.” The Sages says, “Half damages.”
Rabbi Tarfon said to them: “Now, in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain, in which case he is exempt, and stringently in the private domain of him that is injured to pay full damages, then since they have dealt stringently with damage caused by the horn in the public domain, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain of him that was injured, so that full damages be imposed.” They (the said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
He said to them: “I shall not derive the law in one case of damage caused by the horn from the law in another case of damage caused by the horn. Rather I will derive the law of damage caused by the horn from the law of damage caused by the foot. Now in a case in which the law dealt leniently with regards to damages caused by the foot or tooth in the public domain, they have dealt strictly with damage caused by the horn, ought we not deal more stringently with damage cause by the horn in the private domain. They (the said to him: “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred: if [for damages caused by the horn] in the public domain half damages [are imposed], so also [for like damages] in the private domain of him that was injured, half damages [are imposed].
This mishnah deals with one of the clauses from mishnah four of chapter one, which stated that the owner of an ox that damages on the property of the damaged party is obligated for full damages. If the same ox had committed this type of damage in the public domain the owner would only be obligated half damages. However, since a person should be extra careful when they bring their animal onto another person’s property the owner is more liable. Being a father of two little children, the following, albeit imperfect analogy, comes to mind. If I bring an expensive toy over to my son’s friend’s house, and one of the children breaks it, I believe I am at fault. However, if someone brings their child over to my house, and breaks something I believe that they should be at fault. There are many more analogies that one could make; this was just an example.
One important note with regards to learning the mishnah. We will see a dispute between the sages and Rabbi Tarfon, and as part of this dispute the sages will state that, “It is enough if the inferred law is as strict as that from which it is inferred.” This principle means that when you learn a law regarding one situation from a law regarding a similar situation, the inferred law does not need to be stricter than the original law from which it was inferred. This principle is learned from Numbers 12:14 where God punishes Miriam for speaking against Moses. God says, “If her father spat in her face, would she not bear her shame for seven days? Let her be shut out of camp for seven days.” God says that had her father rebuked her, Miriam would have been punished for seven days. One might have thought that God’s rebuke would carry an even more serious consequence. The Torah teaches us the aforementioned principle that the inferred law, the length of Miriam’s punishment when God rebukes her, is not stricter than the law from which it was inferred, the length of Miriam’s punishment had her father rebuked her.
This is a long mishnah and is not a simple one, but we will try in any case to explain briefly. The sages and Rabbi Tarfon argue at length whether an ox that gores or does some other unusual form of damage in the private domain of the one who is injured would be obligated full or half damages. Rabbi Tarfon’s initial argument in section 3 is based on the following chart.
Public Domain
Private domain of him that is injured
Horn
Half damages
Acc. to Rabbi Tarfon full damages.
Foot and tooth
Exempt
Full damages
Rabbi Tarfon claims that since we are lenient on damages caused by the foot and tooth in the public domain and yet strict in the private domain, we should also be strict in the private domain on damages caused by the horn, since after all we were relatively strict in the public domain. The other sages reply that by the means of this type of logical argument one cannot extend the liability for damages caused by the horn, beyond what we already know, that one is liable for half damages.
Rabbi Tarfon’s second argument in section 4 is a different variation on his first argument. He claims that he is not learning liability for damages done by the horn in the private domain from damages done by the horn in the public domain. Rather he emphasizes that he is learning from damages done by the foot and tooth in the private domain, in which case one should not say that one cannot extend the liability, as the sages argued with him. Again the sages reply with the same reply they gave in section 3a. In their opinion, no matter how you phrase it, Rabbi Tarfon’s argument is based on the relative strictness of damages done by the horn in the public domain. Since this is so, the law cannot be extended further by an argument based on logic.

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Bartenura on Mishnah Bava Kamma

דיו לבא מן הדין להיות כנדון – the “horn” in the domain of the one who suffered damages that you bring from the law of the “horn” in the public domain, and as you have said regarding the horn which [the Rabbis] were stringent about it in the public domain, does it not follow logically that we should be strict with it in the domain of the one who supported the damages. It is sufficient that it (i.e., the inferred law) should be like that of the premise, like the horn in the public domain, and not be liable in the domain of the one who suffered damages other than one-half damages just as he is liable in the private domain.

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Bartenura on Mishnah Bava Kamma

אני לא אדון קרן מקרן – as we stated above, but rather the “horn” from the “foot.” The place where he was stringent upon him with the “tooth” and the “foot” does it not follow logically that we should be stringent with the “horn?”

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Bartenura on Mishnah Bava Kamma

דיו לבא מן הדין – for finally, if it is not the “horn” in the public domain, you will not find a side for an a-minori/a-majori. And Rabbi Tarfon, although that in general, he holds that it is enough for it is from the Torah as it is written (Numbers 12:14): “Would she not bear her shame for seven days?” All the more so for God’s presence for fourteen days, but it is enough if the inferred law be as strict as the premise, therefore, “she should be shut out of the camp for seven days” (Numbers 12:14) and no more than that. Nevertheless, here, he does not hold that it is enough for Rabbi Tarfon holds that when we state that it is enough where he didn’t refute an a-minori/a-majori such as there (i.e., Numbers 12:14) of the seven days of God’s Divine presence is not written [in the Biblical verse], the Kal V’Homer brings fourteen. The “it is enough” comes to exclude seven and to establish seven since it mentions this Kal V’Homer for these seven that has been established and it doesn’t refute it completely. But here, the half-damages are written, whether for the public domain or whether in the courtyard of the one who suffered damages, and the Kal V’aHomer comes and brings another one-half damage and makes it full damages. If he had expounded on the “it is enough” and you established ait as high-damages as at the beginning, I would raise to him the objection of the Kal V’Homer and not benefit from it at all. But the Rabbis hold that even where they raise the objection of the Kal V’Homer, we state it as “it is enough” and the Halakha is according to the Sages.

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